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ABSTRACT 
International criminal courts will be judged by their fairness to defendants 
as well as to victims. In a very practical way, such claims will hinge, inter 
alia, on the ability of prosecutors and defendants to have reasonable access 
to probative evidence. But international criminal courts depend on states to 
provide them with evidence or access to evidence. The obligation of states 
to cooperate with international criminal tribunals in the production of 
evidence was at issue in the recent decision of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Blaki case (1997). That judgment 
and the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(1998) that address judicial assistance deserve investigation. Do the rules 
propounded in Blakie and in the Rome Statute create the right conditions 
for the institution of fair trials in international criminal courts in our world 
today? Are such rules possible? The author argues that the diplomats in 
Rome failed to establish a procedure for the production of evidence that will 
lead to the goal of a fair and effective trial. This is cause for concern if and 
when an International Criminal Court comes into being. 
* Jacob Katz Cogan is a law clerk to Judge Sandra Lynch, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. He is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, and the Yale 
Law School. He would like to thank Brannon Denning, Katarina Grenfell, Karen Johnson, 
Sarah Lytle, Brent McIntosh, Michael Reisman, and Andrew Tauber for their helpful criticisms 
of earlier versions of this article. 
1. The author served as a legal intern in the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs at the 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, where the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was 
adopted in July 1998. In no way does this article make use of any confidential 
information to which the author may have been privy, nor does it necessarily represent 
the views of the Office of Legal Affairs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
International criminal courts will be judged by their fairness to defendants 
as well as to victims. In a very practical way, such claims will hinge, inter 
alia, on the ability of prosecutors and defendants to gain reasonable access 
to probative evidence. In domestic legal systems prosecutors have at hand 
the resources and the coercive powers of the state, subject to certain 
constitutional limitations, as they pursue leads and conduct investigations. 
In the international system no such procedures exist. When a state requires 
evidence that is in the possession of another state, it must resort either to 
already existing mutual legal assistance treaties or to diplomatic negotia-
tions.2 When international criminal courts seek such cooperation, prosecu-
tors and investigators must depend on states to provide them with evidence 
or access to evidence.3 Without such assistance, trials cannot go forward 
lest the legitimacy of the proceedings and, by extension, the court itself, be 
called into question.
4 
2. See DAVID MCCLEAN, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (1992). 
3. International courts are dependent on state cooperation in a host of other matters as 
well, including, most importantly, the arrest, detention, and transfer of indicted persons. 
A number of states have enacted statutes to facilitate cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on these matters. See, e.g., Colin 
Warbrick & Dominic McGoldrick, Current Developments in Public International Law: 
Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 45 INT'L & COMP. 
L.Q. 947 (1996) (reviewing the British statute). 
4. The Tadic Court recognized this problem in the context of calling witnesses to testify, 
stating that it is "a difficulty encountered by both parties... [due to]their limited access 
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The obligation of states to cooperate with international criminal 
tribunals in the production of evidence was at issue in the recent Blaki6 
case (1997) before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). s In Blaki6, the Appeals Chamber, reversing the ICTY's 
Trial Chamber, held that the ICTY did not have the power to issue subpoenas 
to states for evidence in their possession; the court could only issue 
non-coercive "binding orders." 6 That decision and the provisions of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) that address judicial 
assistance7deserve investigation. Do the rules propounded in Blaki6 and in 
the Rome Statute create the right conditions for the institution of fair trials in 
international criminal courts in our world today? Are such rules possible?8 
Part II of this article will introduce the problem of obtaining evidence 
for international criminal tribunals and will provide background on the 
to evidence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia." The court decided, however, that 
the "steps ...taken by the International Tribunal to assist the parties .... did appear to 
alleviate the inherent difficulties of the situation." Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, T. Ch. 1i, 91 530-31 (ICTY 7 May 1997), available at 
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement-e/tad-tj970507e.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 
2000) [hereinafter Tadic: Opinion and Judgment]. This aspect of the Trial Chamber's 
decision was one of the grounds for the defendant's appeal, which the Appeals 
Chamber recently rejected, endorsing the principle of "equality of arms" but rejecting 
the contention that the principle was violated in this case. Judgment, Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case Number IT-94-1, App. Ch., 919 43-56 (ICTY 15 July 1999), available at 
<http/www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/udgement/tad-aj990715e.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 
2000) [hereinafter Tadic: Appeals Chamber Judgement]. 
5. Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoenae 
Duces Tecum, Prosecutor v. Blakie, Case No. IT-95-14-T, T. Ch. II(ICTY 18 July 1997), 
available at <httpV/www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialc1/decisions-e/70718SP2.htm> (visited 
16 Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Blaki Il. 
6. Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Prosecutor v. Blakie, Case IT-95-14-AR108bis, App. Ch., 
9]] 25-26 (ICTY 29 Oct. 1997), available at <http/www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/ 
decision-e/71029JT3.html> (visited 16 Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Blagki6 II]. As this article 
was going to press, the Trial Chamber found Blaki: guilty and sentenced him to forty-
five years in prison. See Prosecutor v. Blaki , Judgment: Trial Chamber, Case IT-95-14-
T, 3 Mar. 2000 (visited 15 Mar. 2000), available at <http/www.un.org/icty/blaskic/ 
trialcl/judgement/index-f.htm>. Unfortunately, I have been unable to include in this 
article a discussion of the court's decision. 
7. Rome Statute of the international Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
U.N. Diplomatic Conf. of Plenopotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., 
arts. 86-102, U.N. Doc. A!CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
8. The ICTY, to date, has confronted the question of fair trials most directly in connection 
with witness protection. See Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J.INT'L L. 57, 83-84 
(1999). See also Sara Stapleton, Note, Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal 
Court: Statutory Interpretation and the Impermissibility of Derogation, 31 N.Y.U. J.INT'L 
L. & POE. 535 (1999). The court, however, has not spoken generally on the topic. But see 
Tadic: Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 4, $ 55 ("The Appeals Chamber can 
conceive of situations where a fair trial is not possible because witnesses central to the 
defence case do not appear due to the obstructionist efforts of a State."). 
I 
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Blaki case. Part III will discuss and evaluate the judgments of the Trial 
Chamber and the Appeals Chamber.' I will argue that the Appeals Chamber, 
in its reversal of the lower court's ruling, pragmatically assessed the ICTY's 
limited coercive powers and the primacy of politics and policy when 
confronting states and their national security and sovereignty concerns. 
will suggest, however, that the Appeals Chamber could have strengthened 
the Tribunal's ability to gather evidence by having made a narrower ruling 
that relied on the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
° Herzegovina and not the ICTY Statute" or the UN Charter. 2 In Part IV, I 
will evaluate the provisions of the Rome Statute to determine if the realistic 
approach, which characterized the Appeals Chamber decision in Blaki6, is 
an appropriate template for the International Criminal Court (ICC). I argue 
that it is not. Instead, a teleological approach, ironically similar to that used 
by the Trial Chamber in Bla~ki6, would have made for a more effective ICC 
treaty. The Rome Statute, insofar as it conforms to the Appeals Chamber 
judgment in Blakic, thus, is deficient. This being the case, I conclude in 
Part V that it is unclear whether, in our day, the international community is 
prepared (or able) to give international criminal courts the resources 
necessary to obtain the evidence required to conduct fair trials. 
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING EVIDENCE 
A. The Bla~kit Case 
Tihomir Blaki(, an ethnic Croat, was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1960, was graduated from the Belgrade Military Academy in 1983, and was 
9. To date, there has been only limited discussion of the Blagkie Case in the scholarly 
literature. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 8, at 81-82; Yves Nouvel, Precisions sur le 
pouvoir du Tribunal pour l'ex-Yugoslavie d'ordonner la production des preuves et la 
comparution des t6moins: L'Arr~t de la Chambre d'appel du 29 octobre 1997 dans 
I'affaire Blaki6, 102 REVUEGENERALEDE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC157 (1998); Goran Sluiter, 
Obtaining Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: 
An Overview and Assessment of Domestic Implementing Legislation, 45 NETH. INT'L L. 
REV. 87, 90-91 (1998); Anne Bodley, Note, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in 
International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 417, 459-68 (1999). 
10. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Doc. S/ 
1995/999 (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter General Framework 
Agreement]. 
11. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 
I.L.M. 1159, 1192 (1994) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
12. U.N. CHARTER,signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered 
into force 24 Oct. 1945). 
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commissioned asecond lieutenant in the Yugoslav People's Army that same 
year. 3 Upon the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Blaki( joined the Croatian 
Defense Council (HVO) of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna in 
Bosnia.' 4 By 1992 he had achieved the rank of colonel and commander of 
the Central Bosnia Operative Zone of the HVO, and by August 1993 he held 
the rank of general and was the HVO chief of staff.' s It was during this 
period that the HVO, anticipating the partition of Bosnia, expelled Bosnian 
Muslims from their homes in Croatian controlled territory, massacring some, 
while placing others in concentration camps.' 6 Two years later, on 10 
November 1995, Richard J.Goldstone, then chief prosecutor of the ICTY,'7 
issued an indictment for Blaki6 and five other members of the HVO for 
crimes against humanity and grave breaches and violations of the laws of 
war arising out of their command responsibility.'8 Blakie is one of the 
highest-ranking military officials to be tried to date.' 9 
13. See Indictment, Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14-1, 9] 3 (ICTY 2 Nov. 1995), 
available at <httpV/www.un.org/icty/indictmentenglish/bla-ii951 11 0e.htm> (visited 16 
Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Bla~ki6 Indictment]. The Croatian Association of Former 
Prisoners in Serbian Concentration Camps has sponsored an Internet site on the Blakit 
case that details his biography and his defense strategy. Croatian Association of Former 
Prisoners in Serbian Concentration Camps, Tihomir Blaki6 at the "International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia"--A Prosecution (visited 16 Feb. 2000) <httpv/ 
jagor.srce.hr/zatocen ici/blaskicen.htm>. 
14. See Blagki6 Indictment, supra note 13. For background to the Bosnian war, see, amongst 
numerous writings, WAYNE BERT,THE RELUCTANTSUPERPOWER:UNITED STATES'POLICY IN BOSNIA, 
1991-1995 (1997); NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA (1995); ROBERTI. DONIA & JOHN V.A. 
FINE, JR., BOSNIA & HERCEGOVINA: A TRADITION BETRAYED(1994); MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF 
YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR (1994); NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (1994); 
MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (Alexandra StigImayer ed., 
1994); DAVID RIEFF, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: BOSNIA AND THE FAILURE OF THE WEST (1995); DAVID ROHDE, 
ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE'S WORST MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II 
(1997). 
15. See Blaki6 Indictment, supra note 13, 3. 
16. See CIGAR, supra note 14, at 125-26. 
17. On the creation of the ICTY and the prosecution of its first trial, see MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 
BALKAN JUSTICE (1997). See also THE PROSECUTIONOF INTERNATIONALCRIMES(Roger Clark & 
Madeleine Sann eds., 1996). There are two published compilations of documents 
related to the establishment and functioning of the ICTY: M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER 
MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); 
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995). 
18. See Blakif Indictment, supra note 13, 91T 35-38. The Bla~ki6 indictment has been 
amended twice. Amended Indictment, Prosecutor v. Blaki6, Case No. T-95-14-PT, T. 
Ch. I (ICTY 15 Nov. 1996), available at <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/ 
bla-1 ai9611 22e.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 2000); Second Amended Indictment, Prosecutor 
v. Blagki6, Case No. ICTY-95-14-PT, T. Ch. I (ICTY 25 Apr. 1997), available at <httpv/ 
www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/bla-2ai970425e.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 2000). 
19. See Robert Marquand, Bosnia Trial Shows Court's Rising Clout, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
1 Oct. 1997, at 6. 
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On 15 January 1997, at the request of the Office of the Prosecutor,20 
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, 2t the American trial judge in charge of the Blagki6 
case, issued subpoenae duces tecum to the Republic of Croatia, the 
Croatian Defense Minister Gujko Suak, the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the Custodian of the Records of the Central Archive of the 
Ministry of Defense of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. 22 Croatia 
immediately challenged the subpoenas, arguing that the ICTY had no 
authority to issue coercive orders to states and high government officials 
and that, even if the ICTY had such powers, a state still had the right to limit 
its compliance in order to protect its national security interests.2 3 A series of 
hearings ensued that led to the confirmation of the subpoena by a 
three-judge Trial Chamber panel in July 199724 and then its quashing by the 
5Tribunal's Appeals Chamber the following October.2 
20. The timing of the subpoenas was curious, as it came on the eve of the trial, which had 
already been postponed once before. 
21. Judge McDonald began her career as a civil rights lawyer and was appointed by 
President Jimmy Carter to the federal bench in 1979. She was one of the first judges 
appointed to the ICTY in 1993. After serving as a member of the Trial Chamber, Judge 
McDonald was made a member of the Appeals Chamber and President of the ICTY.She 
retired in the fall of 1999. See Marlise Simons, Then It Was the Klan, Now It's the Balkan 
Agony, N.Y. TIMES,13 Jan. 1999, at A4; James Walsh, "I'm Kind ofA Crusader": With the 
First Bosnian War-Crimes Sentence, Judge Gabrielle McDonald Vents Her Passion for 
Justice,TIME (int'l ed.), 28 July 1997, at 38, available in 1997 WL 10902692. 
22. The Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Republic of Croatia directed Defense Minister 
Gojko Su~ak to provide, inter alia, 
[ailldirectives and orders, signed and unsigned, directed to Tihomir Blatkill ...[a~llorders, 
communications and directives, signed and unsigned, directed to Mate Boban, the General Staff of 
the HVO and the Ministry of Defense of the Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna and its 
representatives, . . . from 1April 1992 to 1 January 19941, and] [a]llCroatian government Ministry 
of Defense documents, records, reports and orders reflecting the presence of HV military 
personnel and their activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from November 1991 to 
I July1994.... 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Republic of Croatia, Prosecutor v. Blakie, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, Judge McDonald (ICTY 15 Jan. 1997) (Registry Page no. (RP) D488-93). 
23. Paragraph 1 of the Brief of the Republic of Croatia on Subpoenae Duces Tecum 
provides that: "It is the position of the Croatian Government that a subpoena duces 
tecum, as an order issued 'under penalty,' has no legal grounds as a form of 
communication between the Tribunal and sovereign States and their government 
officials." Brief of the Republic of Croatia on Subpoenae Duces Tecum, Prosecutor v. 
Blagkif, T. Ch. II, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, 9 1 (ICTY 1 Apr. 1997) (RP D3682-84); 
Republic of Croatia, Reply to Subpoena Duces Tecum, Prosecutor v. Blakie, Case No. 
IT-95-14-PT, T. Ch. I (ICTY 10 Feb. 1997) (RP D3261-63). 
24. See Blaki I, supra note 5. 
25. See Bla~kie II,supra note 6. 
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B. What's at Stake 
For a procedural matter, the subpoena issue garnered a great deal of 
attention from the international legal community. No fewer than five 
countries, seven individuals, two international organizations, and one 
Croatian professional association submitted amicus curiae briefs to the 
various proceedings.2 6 In the months following the Appeals Chamber 
judgment, as the Rome Conference on the Establishment of an International 
Court neared, national delegations and NGOs took additional interest in the 
case.27 It is not difficult to understand why. 
The importance of the issue for the ICTY is clear: criminal courts require 
evidence to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. "I am aware 
that Blagki6 is one of the most, if not the most important case, I will ever try," 
Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour noted a month before the Appeals Chamber 
8handed down its judgment. 2 "The issues have everything to do with the 
coming of age of the tribunal as a criminal court. It is the first time in history 
we are putting this question to the test: Can international law apply in the 
area of criminal law?" 29 BlakiCs defense attorney was no less interested. 
"[Ihf the court can't request records, then I can't defend my client," Russell 
Hayman pointed out.3" Without such evidence, the prosecutors in The 
26. See id. 17 (noting that China, the Netherlands, Canada and New Zealand, Norway, 
Ruth Wedgwood, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, 
Juristes sans fronti~res and Alain Pellet, Carol Elder Bruce, and Herwig Roggemann 
submitted amicus curiae briefs); Bla~kii I, supra note 5, 10 (noting that the following 
were given leave to submit amicus briefs to the Trial Chamber: Bruno Simma, Bartram 
Brown, the Croatian Association of Criminal Science and Practice, the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, Juristes sans frontires, Luigi Condorelli, the Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Peter Malanczuk, 
Juan-Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Thomas Warrick et al., Ruth Wedgwood, and Annelisa 
Ciampri). See also Order Granting Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae [Variousi, 
Prosecutor v. Blaki, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, T. Ch. II (ICTY 11 Apr. 
1997), available at <http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/ordel 4.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 2000) 
(inviting, among others, Juristes sans fronti~res, Luigi Condorelli, the Croatian Associa-
tion of Criminal Science and Practice, Andreas Zimmermann, Ruth Wedgwood, 
Marie-Jos6 Domestici-Met, Peter Malanczuk, and the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights to appear at oral argument). Of the permanent five members of the Security 
Council, only China submitted a brief in the case. 
27. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
28. Marquand, supra note 19, at 6 (quoting Arbour). 
29. Id. (quoting Arbour). In a speech given before the Appeals Chamber decision, she 
stated: "1 believe this may be the single most important issue that I will have to address 
in my term of office as Chief Prosecutor .... This is an absolutely critical phase in the 
development of the ICTY." Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & 
PoL'Y SYMp.37, 38 (1999). 
30. Marquand, supra note 19, at 6 (quoting Hayman). See also Tracy Wilkinson, Reason to 
Take on War Crimes, L.A. TIMES, 15 May 1998, at Al. 
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Hague are at a huge disadvantage when called upon to meet their burden of 
proof; the defense counsel are under similar constraints. 
States, however, are under no general obligation to release evidence 
within their jurisdiction, and the Tribunal itself has no mechanism to enforce 
its will upon states. As the court recognized in its first annual report in 1994, 
"the Tribunal was not endowed with direct enforcement powers."31 In 
contrast to Nuremberg," where the problem of obtaining evidence was 
never an issue because the Allies had unhampered access to the German 
archives, the ICTY, "[t]o fulfil all [its] tasks, ... must rely upon the domestic 
legal system and the enforcement machinery of each State." 33 The difficulty 
of obtaining evidence, accordingly, is nowhere more complicated than in 
the former Yugoslavia, where the alleged crimes were often conducted by 
(or under instructions from) state actors and where the evidence of these 
crimes remains within the jurisdiction of interested parties.14 When the 
accused is charged with crimes emanating from his command responsibil-
ity, as in Blaki6, states are highly resistant to disclosing evidence that might 
inculpate one of their own. But it is especially in these types of cases, where 
the chain of command must be established, that prosecutors are most in 
need of evidence from a state's military archives. 5 In Bosnia, while the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) has facilitated the investigative work of the 
Office of the Prosecutor in territory under IFOR control, 36 much of the most 
31. Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 
152, T 84, U.N. Doc. A/49/342-S/1 994/1007, at 3, 27 (1994) [hereinafter First Annual 
Report]. 
32. According to Kenneth Anderson, "[Tl hose who want to imitate Nuremberg in Yugosla-
via have deeply mistaken what the Nuremberg trial was all about. At its core Nuremberg 
was about foregoing what was in one's hand; this Yugoslavia tribunal wants to grasp 
what the world has not been willing to put there." Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg 
Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 281, 
293 (1994) (book review). 
33. First Annual Report, supra note 31, T 84. 
34. See STEVEN R. RATNER& JASONS. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIESIN 
INTERNATIONALAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY225 (1997). 
35. "Prosecutors require more than names of military commanders or even witness 
accounts about cruelty and killing. To build their case against commanders, they need 
to link those responsible for crimes directly to the events and to present proof of who 
gave orders and who knew about atrocities." Marlise Simons, Court Calls for Evidence, 
Not Politics, N.Y. TIMES, 9 Apr. 1999, at Al 1. 
36. See Fifth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 9 123, U.N. 
Doc. A/53/219-S/1998/737 (1998) ("Productive working relationships with organiza-
tions in the former Yugoslavia continues to be crucial to the success of the Prosecutor's 
investigations."). IFOR is now assisting the war crimes investigators in their work in 
Kosovo. See Marlise Simons, Crisis in the Balkans: War Crimes Investigators Prepare for 
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 22 
important evidence remains outside of Bosnia-in Croatia, Serbia, and in 
Western security archives. In Blagki6, prosecutors, stymied by their inability 
to garner evidence essential to their case, seized upon the subpoena. 
Prosecutors also sought the subpoena in order to alleviate the persistent 
problem of the uneven and instrumental provision of evidence by states. 
When asked if the United States had provided the ICTY with all the 
information it had available, Richard Goldstone lamented that "[i]t's 
impossible to know without knowing everything they have."3 7 A state might 
try to influence the outcome of a trial by providing the Tribunal with only 
partial access to evidence it has in its possession. A state might also time the 
release of its evidence to suit its own purposes. So, for instance, even 
though Britain recently said it would provide the ICTY with evidence 
relating to possible war crimes by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, 
one can ask, as Goldstone did, "whether the information now being offered 
wasn't available two, three, or four years ago?"38 Certainly some of it was 
and the reason for Britain's newly found generosity in the case of Milosevic 
is no great secret: previously, Britain, together with the United States and 
other countries, had decided that Milosevic, despite his crimes, was an 
important player in the peaceful settlement of the Bosnian crisis. Now that 
Milosevic is persona non grata for his actions in Kosovo, the West is willing 
to provide evidence crucial to his indictment and prosecution. As Michael 
Posner of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights put it, "[Cooperation is] 
like a spigot. . . . [States] want to turn it on and off as it suits their 
purposes.1 3 9 
But if the subpoena power is important for the successful investigation 
and prosecution of cases before the ICTY, there are countervailing consider-
ations as well. If the Appeals Chamber were to have upheld the subpoena in 
Blakhf, future subpoenas no doubt would have been issued to Serbia to 
determine the role of the Yugoslav Army in the Bosnian conflict.40 More 
importantly, what would have stopped a Trial Chamber from issuing a 
subpoena to a national intelligence agency not directly party to the dispute, 
Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES,7 June 1999, at Al1 ("Britain has offered to escort investigators as its 
troops enter Kosovo to help them start their inquiries immediately .... [Prosecutor
Arbour] has also asked some NATO members to fly special missions with the unmanned 
reconnaissance planes known as drones inorder to collect information of value for the 
tribunal .. ."). 
37. Raymond Bonner, Crimes Court Not Ready to Punish Kosovo Violence, N.Y. TIMES, 31 
Mar. 1999, at All (quoting Richard Goldstone). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. (quoting Michael Posner). Cf. Raymond Bonner, Despite Indictment, Politicians and 
Diplomats Control Milosevic's Future, N.Y. TIMES, 28 May 1999, at Al 3 (pointing out 
that, despite Milosevic's indictment, the ICTY is still dependent on states to apprehend 
him). 
40. See Marquand, supra note 19, at 6. 
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such as the CIA, which repeatedly has been accused of not sharing all the 
documents in its possession that are relevant to the ICTY's investigations?
41 
In all likelihood, most of these subpoenas would never be complied with 
and, in the case of the United States, they would put the ICTY in direct 
conflict with an important and essential backer. The ICTY's legitimacy as a 
court and perhaps its future existence might be put in peril by such 
sweeping subpoena powers. The court would be damned if it did (risking 
non-compliance by a major benefactor) and damned if it didn't (leading to 
charges of bias if it failed to issue subpoenas to national security agencies 
that retained evidence indispensable to the prosecution or the defense). 
Furthermore, to the extent that a state's (say, the United States) uneven 
provision of evidence to the ICTY is, in fact, a symptom of its attempt to 
come to a peaceful solution of an international conflict, we might be less 
sanguine about the court's exercising strong subpoena powers.4 2 While it is 
clear why the ICTY prosecutors were so eager to make use of the subpoena 
power in Blakif and why they believed that that power is so crucial to the 
effective prosecution of the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, it is less 
clear whether giving this power to the Tribunal is in the best interests of the 
ICTY or of the implementation of humanitarian law generally. 
The Appeals Chamber's decision also had implications well beyond the 
ICTY. Not so subtly hidden under the debate in Blaki6 was the movement 
for the creation of an ICC. 4" Long favored by human rights advocates,44 the 
41. See Bonner, supra note 37, at Al1 (reporting that "[ulntil now Western Governments 
have been disinclined to share their intelligence information"); Raymond Bonner, War 
Crimes Panel Finds Croat Army 'Cleansed' Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, 21 Mar. 1999, at Al 
(reporting that "the United States has failed to provide critical evidence requested by the 
tribunal" so that its involvement in the Balkan war might remain concealed). 
42. The ICTY's indictment of Slobodan Milosevic in the midst of the Kosovo air campaign 
raised similar concerns. Might not the ICTY's actions hamper attempts to end the 
conflict? See Jane Perlez, Some Fears Over Talks; Aides Worry, N.Y. TIMES, 28 May 
1999, at A10. In all likelihood, however, the Milosevic indictment was issued with the 
prior tacit consent of Western governments, upon whom the ICTY would have been 
reliant for evidence to support its accusations. See also Bonner, supra note 37, at Al 1, 
and accompanying text. 
43. For some selected recent histories and appraisals of the idea of an international criminal 
court, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The 
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 
(1997); Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes 
Tribunal, 18 FLETCHERF. ON WORLD AFF. 77 (1994); John W. Bridge, The Case for an 
International Court of Criminal Justice and the Formulation of International Criminal 
Law, in INTERNATIONALCOURTS FORTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 213 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1992); 
John Dugard, Obstacles in the Way of an InternationalCriminal Court, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
329 (1997); Timothy C. Evered, An InternationalCriminal Court: Recent Proposals and 
American Concerns, 6 PACEINT'L L. REV. 121 (1994); Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without 
Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L 
L. 73 (1995); Michael P. Scharf, The Politics of Establishing an InternationalCriminal 
Court, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167 (1995); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed 
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plan for an ICC received increasing political support during the 1990s,15 
culminating in the Rome Conference on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court in 1998. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the ICTY 
will be perceived as a benchmark for the creation and future operation of 
4 6 
the new court. 
In no area will this be truer than procedure, where little has been 
developed since the Nuremberg trials fifty years ago. 47 The ICTY Statute 
gave the judges the power to "adopt rules of procedure and evidence."48 
And, as Judge McDonald admitted at an academic conference in August 
1997, referring to the ICTY, "We basically created an international code of 
criminal procedure." 49 Any decision of the court interpreting the ICTY's 
rules is bound to have important consequences for a future ICC, for which 
Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665 (1996); 
Alex C. Lakatos, Note, Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the 
International Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses' Needs Against 
Defendants' Rights, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 909 (1995). For a useful collection of documents, 
see BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,AN INTERNATIONALCRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE-A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1980). 
44. According to one estimate, over three hundred human rights and legal reform 
associations, including the American Bar Association, have argued in favor of an ICC. 
See Douglas W. Cassel, Jr., A New International Criminal Court: Will It Be Indepen-
dent?, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., 9 Mar. 1998, at 6; World Criminal Court: All Gum, No Teeth?, 
ECONOMIST (London), 14 Mar. 1998, at 50. Many of these NGOs have banded together to 
form the Coalition for an. International Criminal Court. See The CICC International 
Criminal Court Home Page (visited 10 Feb. 2000) <httpV/www.igc.org/icc>. 
45. See Wexler, supra note 43, at 666 n.6. Samantha Power points out, however, that
"while national governments usually choose to forego retributive justice [in favor of 
truth commissions], outsiders (including the United States) are formally swearing by it." 
Samantha Power, The Stages ofJustice, NEW REPUBLIC,2 Mar. 1998, at 38, 39 (reviewing 
MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVEMEMORY, AND THELAW (1998)). 
46. According to Morris and Scharf: "If the International Tribunal demonstrates that such an 
institution can function effectively and efficiently, then the case for establishing a 
permanent court will be strengthened beyond measure." MORRIS & SCHARF,supra note 17, 
at 354. See also Danesh Sarooshi, The Powers of the United Nations International 
Criminal Tribunals, 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 141, 167 (1998). Jelena Rejic argues, 
however, that "the emerging profile of an ICC is so different from that of the ad hoc 
Tribunal that the very notion of the latter's success as being critical to the former may be 
called into question." Jelena Pejic, The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60 
ALB. L. REV. 841 (1997). 
47. See MORRIS & SCHARF,supra note 17, at 175. According to James Crawford, however, 
"[rlather stringent standards have been laid down in international human rights treaties,
regulating due process in criminal trials." James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for 
an International Criminal Court, 89 AM. J.INT'L L. 404, 407 (1995). See generally Richard 
May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, 
the Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725 (1999). 
48. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 15. 
49. Barbara Crossette, World Criminal Court Having Painful Birth, N.Y. TIMES, 13 Aug. 1997, 
at Al 0 (quoting Judge McDonald). 
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new Rules of Procedure and Evidence are currently being negotiated. 0 It is 
to Blakie, the most important ICTY decision to date on the rules of evidence 
that we now turn. 
11. BLASKIC: THE SUBPOENA POWER ASSERTED AND REASSESSED 
The importance of the subpoena power to the ICTY and to a future ICC was 
foremost in Judge McDonald's mind when she wrote the Trial Chamber 
opinion in BlaWki6. 1 But in her attempt to achieve the laudable goal of an 
effective tribunal, Judge McDonald overreached. Her judgment would have 
allowed a Trial Chamber to issue subpoenas to all states; the issue in 
Blakie,however, was more limited. Could the court issue a subpoena to the 
Republic of Croatia, one of the parties to the dispute in the former 
Yugoslavia? Confronted with Judge McDonald's broad ruling, the Appeals 
Chamber wisely retreated from the Trial Chamber's judgment. It recognized 
the ability of the court to issue only what it termed "binding orders" to 
states. As I will argue, however, if Judge McDonald had written a narrower 
opinion based upon the text of the General Framework Agreement that 
ended the Bosnian War, the Appeals Chamber would, in all likelihood, have 
upheld the subpoena in Blaki6. The larger, and more problematic issue of 
whether the ICTY could issue subpoenas to states not party to the Bosnia 
conflict could have been avoided. 
A. Blagkit I: Finding What You Are Looking For 
Judge McDonald's decision was based on a theory of "inherent" and 
"expressed" powers, as well as a comparison with the subpoena powers of 
national courts and other international judicial bodies. Judge McDonald 
50. This istrue not simply for precedential reasons but also because many of the players that 
created the ad hoc tribunals are also behind the creation of the ICC. See Peter Burns, An 
International Criminal Tribunal: The Difficult Union of Principle and Politics, 5 CRIM. 
L.F. 341, 350-51 (1994). For one of the few scholarly investigations of a procedural 
aspect of the ICTY, see Mark Thieroff & Edward A. Amley, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and 
Accountability in the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 231 (1998). 
51. Judge McDonald suspended the subpoena on 19 Feb. 1997 inorder to allow the parties 
to resolve the matter informally. That having failed, Judge McDonald ordered that the 
matter be heard by the full Trial Chamber. See Blagki6 I, supra note 5, 919 2-12 
(recounting the procedural history leading up to the Trial Chamber's decision). See In 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Trial Chamber 
(visited 16 Feb. 2000) <httpV/www.un.org/icty/transe14/9704161T.txt> (providing an 
unpaginated transcript of the oral arguments) [hereinafter Oral Argument. 
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looked first to Article 29 of the UN Charter, which states that "[t]he Security 
Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions."- 2 McDonald found that "subsidiary organs 
may be empowered to perform the functions of the Security Council even to 
the extent that this may have external consequences." s3 Thus, Judge 
McDonald concluded that the ICTY, as a Security Council subsidiary organ 
established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 4 is an independent
5 5 
court.international 
As an international court, McDonald argued, the ICTY retained certain 
inherent powers. Following the line of arguments made in the Prosecutor's 
brief,56 McDonald found that "the International Tribunal should be deemed 
to have those powers which, although not expressly conferred, arise by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties."" 
Because compelled production of evidence was "part of the inherent 
powers of a judicial organ," 8 and because the Security Council intended 
that the ICTY be effective, McDonald concluded that the subpoena power, 
though not expressly granted, may be implied. 9 Thus, "an order or 
52. U.N. CHARTERart. 29. 
53. Blatki f I, supra note 5, 11 20 (quoting THE CHARTEROF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 
486 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994) (commentary by Meinhard Hilf)). 
54. Article 41 of the UN Charter states: "The Security Council may decide what measures 
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, 
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures ...... 
U.N. CHARTERart. 41. See also Danesh Sarooshi, The Legal Framework Governing United 
Nations Subsidiary Organs, 64 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 422 (1996) (delineating the authority of 
the principal organs of the United Nations to create subsidiary organs). 
55. See Blaki6 I, supra note 5, 91 17, 23. 
56. See Prosecutor's Brief in Support of Subpoenae Duces Tecum, Prosecutor v. Blagkif, 
Case No. IT-95-14-PT, T. Ch. II (ICTY 1 Apr. 1997) (RP D3620-3671) (setting out a 
theory of inherent and express powers). Paragraph 3 of the Amicus Curiae Brief states: 
The Statute does not expressly confer upon the Tribunal the capacity to address subpoenas orders; 
however, the Tribunal must be deemed under International Law to have those powers which, 
though not expressly provided in the Statute, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as 
being essential to the performance of its duties. 
Amicus Curiae Brief Presented by Professor Juan-Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Prosecutor v. 
Blatki6, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, T. Ch. II, at 4 (ICTY 5 Apr. 1997) (RP D4660-72). 
57. Blatki6 I, supra note 5, 9124. 
58. Id. 
59. The court relied on language in the following decisions of the International Court of 
Justice: Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 
171, 182 ("Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those 
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties."); Effect of 
Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 
I.C.I.47, 57 ("Capacity to do this arises by necessary intendment out of the Charter."); 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 ("But when the 
Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the 
fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that 
such action is not ultra vires the Organization."). 
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subpoena for the production of evidence is appropriate where the fairness of 
the trial so requires." 
60 
Judge McDonald found further evidence of such implied powers in the 
abilities of national courts to issue subpoenas. The ICTY, according to her 
reading of the statute,61 could not have lesser powers to prosecute war 
crimes than national courts.62 After canvassing the powers of various 
national courts, she found that, because they all had subpoena powers (to 
varying degrees), so too must the ICTY. 63 
Judge McDonald also garnered textual authority to support her posi-
tion.64 Article 18 of the ICTY Statute, she pointed out, gave the prosecutor 
the power to collect evidence and seek the assistance of the states. 6 And 
Article 19 allowed judges to issue "orders as may be required for the 
conduct of the trial." 66 In its application of these articles, Rule 54 of the 
ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence explicitly stated that a judge, at the 
request of either party, "may issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, 
warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an 
investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the trial."67 From these 
textual and non-textual sources Judge McDonald concluded that the ICTY 
was capable of issuing orders to states and that such orders would not 
offend a state's sovereignty.
68 
To bolster her claim, Judge McDonald drew parallels to other interna-
tional courts. She noted that the rules of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) give the ICJ the power to "call upon" the parties to bring witnesses or 
60. The Blakie I decision notes that Article 20 of the statute directs the Trial Chamber 
to ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious ...[and that] Article 21, paragraph 4(e) provides that 
the accused shall be entitled "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him." 
Blagkhf I, supra note 5, Z 32. 
61. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 9, 91 2. Paragraph 35 of the Blatkie I decision notes "its 
capacity to obtain all the necessary documents for the adjudication of a case cannot be 
less than that of [national] courts." BlaWkiW I, supra note 5, !1 35. 
62. Here, she follows the line of argument put forward by the Prosecutor in oral argument: 
In my submission, if nothing else, it [the subpoena power] would have to form part of the inherent 
powers of a criminal court. There would be no doubt that a mechanism would have to be designed 
by the court itself to allow it to get access to the evidence that is necessary for a fair disposition of 
the case. 
Oral Argument, supra note 51. 
63. Blakie I, supra note 5, 919136-40. 
64. Id 42. 
65. See ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 18, 912. 
66. Id. art. 19, 9 2. 
67. ICTY R. Proc. & Evid. 54. The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as amended, are 
available on the Internet at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev1 7con.htm> 
(visited 16 Feb. 2000). 
68. Blaki5 I, supra note 5,91%50-51. 
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produce evidence.69 While the ICJ had no power to compel the production 
of evidence, the Trial Chamber concluded that the ICJ could draw a negative 
inference from non-compliance.70 The same was true, Judge McDonald 
claimed, of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the 
European Court of Human Rights.7 1 Judge McDonald concluded 
that it is a familiar concept that States can be addressed by international 
tribunals for the purpose of production of documents in their possession, when 
such are necessary for an international judicial determination. While these 
other international tribunals cannot compel this production by States, they do 
have as an inducement the power to draw a negative inference.72 
Judge McDonald was, she admitted, more concerned with the power 
"to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence" 
and less with "the consequences of non-compliance." 73 Even so, the court 
recognized some limits on its subpoena power, including relevancy and 
specificity,74 and, most importantly, national security. While the Trial 
Chamber acknowledged the legitimacy of an assertion of national security, 
it decided that it was for the tribunal and not for the state to decide the 
scope and application of the privilege. Though international7 and national 
69. Article 49 states: "The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents 
to produce any document or to supply any explanations. Formal note shall be taken of 
any refusal." Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 49, annexed to U.N. 
CHARTER, signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (entered into 
force 24 Oct. 1945). Article 62(1) of the Rules of the International Court of Justice states: 
"The Court may at any time call upon the parties to produce such evidence or to give 
such explanations as the Court may consider to be necessary for the elucidation of any 
aspect of the matters in issue, or may itself seek other information for this purpose." I.C.J. 
Rules of Court, adopted 14 Apr. 1978, art. 62(1), available at <httpV/www.icj-cij.org/ 
icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictextibasicrulesofcourt.html> (visited 16 Feb. 2000). 
70. Blaki6 I, supra note 5, 9153. It is unclear whether the Trial Chamber's assertion is in 
fact true. Article 49 of the ICJstatute simply states that the court may take "formal note" 
of "any refusal" to comply with the court's request. There is no indication, either in the 
Statute or in the court's practice, that suggests that "formal note" is equivalent to 
"negative inference." Cf. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND 
ENFORCEMENTOF INTERNATIONALJUDCMENTSAND AWARDS 593-603 (1971) (discussing the Rule in 
Parker's Case). 
71. Blakif I, supra note 5, 9154. 
72. Id. T 56. Even if Judge McDonald's assertions were true, what good is a negative 
inference in a criminal tribunal where the subpoenaed party itself is not on trial? 
73. Id. 9 61 (citing ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 29). Paragraph 62 states, "The Trial 
Chamber considers that use of a subpoena does not necessarily imply the assertion of a 
power to imprison or fine, as it may in a national context" and suggests a range of 
"penalties" from "a note of non-compliance and reference of the matter to the Security 
Council ...to consideration of utilizing the inherent contempt power or that provided 
for in Rule 77 against individuals who fail to comply." Id. 1162. 
74. See Blaki6 I, supra note 5, TIE 99-105 (reviewing limits that national courts place on 
the subpoena power). 
75. See id. 919116-122 (discussing the Corfu Channel Case, the Godfnez Cruz Case, and 
The Observer and the Guardian v. The United Kingdom, and finding them unhelpful). 
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courts76 have often recognized or accommodated the privilege (or have not 
penalized its assertion),7 7 and the national implementing legislation for the 
ICTY of a number of nations specifically reserved the privilege,7 8 the Trial 
Chamber stressed that the ICTY was created under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter: "A unilateral right of a State to withhold information necessary for 
the proceedings on national security grounds would prejudice the capacity 
of the International Tribunal to ensure a fair trial." 79 Not only would it be 
"contrary to the spirit and the language of the Statute and to the nature and 
purpose of the International Tribunal to permit a State to invoke, absolutely, 
a national security privilege,"8 ° the ICTY itself, the court asserted, was in a 
position to be the best decision maker.81 
Judge McDonald had her eyes on the prize: an effective ICTY that was 
capable of holding fair trials. Her judgment would have allowed the Trial 
Chamber to issue subpoenas to states, subject only to certain national 
security, specificity, and relevancy limitations. Her opinion, however, did 
not concern itself with the unique context in which international courts 
operate. On the contrary, Judge McDonald relied on analogies to domestic 
courts to justify the Trial Chamber decision. Such an opinion could not (and 
did not) stand for long. 
B. Blaskic It: The Realistic Approach 
The Decision of the Trial Chamber was immediately appealed to the 
Appeals Chamber. 2 In its judgment, handed down on 29 October 1997, the 
76. See id. TT 124-26 (discussing the United States, Canada, Pakistan, Costa Rica, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom). 
77. The International Court of Justice, in the Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 
4, requested certain documents that 
were not produced, the Agent pleading naval secrecy; and the United Kingdom witnesses 
declined to answer questions relating to them. It is not therefore possible to know the real content 
of these naval orders. The Court cannot, however, draw from this refusal to produce the orders 
any conclusions differing from those to which the actual events gave rise. 
Id. at 32. 
78. See Blagkif I, supra note 5, 99 127-29. 
79. Id. T 131. 
80. Id. 91133. 
81. That decision was not arbitrary however. When evaluating a national security claim, 
the trial court judge must consider two interests: "the interest in upholding the national 
security interest of a State and the interest ingaining access to the evidence critical to 
the prosecution or defence in cases relating to serious violations of international 
humanitarian law." Id. !9 149. 
82. The Appeals Chamber accepted review of the appeal on 29 July 1997, Decision on the 
Admissibility of the Request for Review by the Republic of Croatia of an Interlocutory 
Decision of a Trial Chamber (Issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum) and Scheduling 
Order, Prosecutor v. Blaki, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, App. Ch. (ICTY 29 July 
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Appeals Chamber evidenced a starkly different approach from that of the 
Trial Chamber. Whereas the lower court had analogized the powers of the 
ICTY to those of national courts, the higher court held that "domestic 
judicial views or approaches should be handled with the greatest caution at 
the international level, lest one should fail to make due allowance for the 
unique characteristics of international criminal proceedings."83 
The Appeals Chamber began by finding that a subpoena, by which it 
meant an order "the non-compliance with which may be 'sanctioned' as 
contempt of court,"84 could not be issued to states. "Had the drafters of the 
Statute intended to vest the International Tribunal with such a power," the 
court noted, "they would have expressly provided for it."8" A subpoena was 
not an inherent function of an international judicial body, as the Trial 
Chamber had concluded.8 6 Therefore, only orders or requests could be 
addressed to states."' The binding force of such orders "derives from the 
provisions of Chapter VII and Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and 
from the Security Council resolution adopted pursuant to those provi-
" 8sions. 
What were the proper legal remedies for a state's non-compliance with 
a binding order? The Tribunal could only make judicial findings of 
non-compliance.8 9 It was for the Security Council alone to impose sanctions 
if it so desired.90 The Tribunal could not, however, issue subpoenas or even 
1997), and refused to set aside this decision on August 12. Decision on Prosecution 
Motion to Set Aside the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 29 July 1997, Prosecutor 
v. Blatki, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, App. Ch. (ICTY 12 Aug. 1997). Briefs were 
submitted in late Aug. and early Sept., and oral arguments were heard on 22 Sept. A 
transcript of the oral arguments is available at <http://www.un.orgficty/transe14/ 
9709221T.txt> (visited 16 Feb. 2000). 
83. Bla~kif II, supra note 6, 1I 23. 
84. Id. 9 21. 
85. Id. 9 25. 
86. The Appeals Chamber differentiated between "inherent" and "implied" powers. The ICJ, 
the court found, used the implied powers doctrine "with a view to expanding the 
competencies of political organs of international organizations." Id. 9 25 n.27 
(emphasis in original (citing, inter alia, cases cited supra note 59). The concept of 
inherent powers was used to insure that "the exercise of [the ICJ's] jurisdiction over the 
merits, if and when established, shall not be frustrated, and.., to provide for the orderly 
settlement of all matters in dispute." Id. (quoting Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 
259-60, 9 23). 
87. Id. T 25; ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 29; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 321 7th mtg., 
9 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
88. Blatki II,supra note 6, 9 26. The court specified the content of the binding orders as 
follows: (1) "identify specific documents"; (2) "set out succinctly the reasons why such 
documents are deemed relevant to the trial"; (3) "not be unduly onerous"; (4) "give the 
requested State sufficient time for compliance[.]" Id. 9 32. 
89. Id. 9 33. See also id. 9 35-36 (setting out rules for judicial findings). 
90. Id. T 33. 
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binding orders to state officials (though it could issue subpoenas to 
individuals acting in their private capacity).1 
The Appeals Chamber decision was a clear rebuke of the Trial 
Chamber's conclusion and methodology.92 Taking into account the peculiar 
91. Id. 9138-45 (state officials), 46-60 (individuals in their private capacity). 
Upholding the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber recognized that certain re-
quested documents may be covered by a national security privilege, but the court (and 
not the state) was to decide whether the privilege applied. See id. 9 62-66 (discussing 
the Sabotage, Ballo, Godinez Cruz cases and Cyprus v. Turkey, as well as Article 2, 
paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter). When deciding whether an assertion of 
national security is applicable, the court held that the Trial Chamber: (1) should take 
into account "whether the State concerned has acted and is acting bona fide[;]" (2) 
should have only one judge look at the relevant documents; (3) should have the state 
submit certified translations, if necessary; (4) should look at the documents in camera 
and ex parte; (5) should return the irrelevant or privileged documents to the state; and 
(6) should allow for certain extremely sensitive documents not to be submitted for 
scrutiny. Id. 9168. Judge Adolphus G. Karibi-Whyte wrote a separate opinion that took 
issue with items two and three of the court's national security procedures. See Separate 
Opinion of Judge Adolphus G. Karibi-Whyte, Prosecutor v. Blakie, Case No. 
IT-95-14-ARI 08bis, App. Ch., 194 (ICTY 29 Oct. 1997), available at <http/www.un.org/ 
icty/blaskic/appeal/decision-e/71029JTK.html> (visited 16 Feb. 2000). 
92. After the decision was handed down, the Office of the Prosecutor made the unconvinc-
ing claim that the Appeals Chamber had decided in its favor. Prosecutor Arbour 
described the Appeals Chamber decision as "a vindication of the prosecution's 
position," and promised to "seek a binding order for the production of [Croatian] 
documents." Croatia Wins Appeal Against UN Court Subpoena, ANP English News 
Bulletin, 30 Oct. 1997, available in Lexis, NEWS Library, ANPENG File. The decision, 
however, was far from what the prosecution had originally desired. The Office of the 
Prosecutor has since issued an "order" to Croatia in accordance with the Appeals 
Chamber ruling. See Order to the Republic of Croatia for the Production of Documents, 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. ICTY-95-14-T, T. Ch. I (ICTY 21 July 1998), available at 
<http/www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/order-e/80721 PN16152.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 
2000). Croatia challenged the binding order on national security grounds. See Decision 
on the Notice of State Request for Review of Order on the Motion of the Prosecutor for 
the Issuance of a Binding Order on the Republic of Croatia for the Production of 
Documents and Request for Stay of Trial Chamber's Order of 30 January 1998, 
Prosecutor v. Blaki, Case No. IT-95-14-T, App. Ch. (ICTY 26 Feb. 1998), available at 
<http/www.un.org/ictylblaskic/appeal/decision-e/80226SD3.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 2000); 
Order for a Witness to Appear, Prosecutor v. Bla kuf, Case No. IT-95-14-T, T. Ch. I 
(ICTY 5 Nov. 1998), available at <httpV/www.un.orglicty/blaskic/trialcl/order-e/ 
81105WG16153.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 2000). Judge McDonald, in her capacity as 
president of the ICTY, has reported Croatia to the Security Council fornoncompliance 
with Tribunal requests, though not the requests at issue in Blakiof. See War Crime 
Tribunal Reports Croatia to Security Council for "Non-Cooperation," FRANCEAGENCE 
PRESSE, Library, CURNWS File. Immediately25 Aug. 1999, available in Lexis, NEWS 
after Bla.ki was found guilty in March 2000, see supra note 6, Croatia said that it 
would release newly discovered documents that had been withheld by the regime of the 
late president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman. The documents, Croatian officials asserted, 
will assist Blaki6 in his appeal of the guilty verdict. See Croatia to Release Documents 
to Defend Bosnian Croat War Criminal, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE,6 Mar. 2000, available in 
Lexis, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. 
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nature of international tribunals in general, and the ICTY in particular,93 the 
Appeals Chamber took a pragmatic approach to the subpoena question. The 
Chamber delicately balanced the need for an effective investigation with a 
realistic assessment of the means by which an ICTY investigation is likely to 
succeed. 
C. An Alternative Solution 
The Trial Chamber in its teleological approach to its judgment looked to 
national courts and their coercive powers, as well as to the ICJ and other 
international courts. Even assuming correct facts,94 the analogies were 
misplaced. The ICTY is not like the ICJ (where jurisdiction is consensual), 
nor is it like national courts (which are governed by constitutional 
documents or other fundamental political structures). The Trial Chamber's 
error, thus, was not in its desire to achieve a teleological end (that is, fair 
trials) but in its method of how best to get there. It was the Trial Chamber's 
erroneous approach that made the issue in Blaki6 unnecessarily grand.95 
Given the realities of world politics, the Appeals Chamber had no choice 
but to temper the lower court's ruling. 
But instead of relying on Chapter VII of the UN Charter as the fount of 
the subpoena power, both courts might have found an alternative-and 
much less politically problematic-textual source in the treaty that ended 
the war in Bosnia: the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Article IX of that Agreement states: 
The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of 
this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which 
93. The court explicitly rebutted the prosecutor's and Trial Chamber's resort to the 
"domestic analogy" for their justification of the power to subpoena state officials; "The 
setting is totally different in the international community," the court noted. Blakil II, 
supra note 6, T 40. The international community was without a "central government
with the attendant separation of powers and checks and balances .... [[International 
courts, including the International Tribunal, do not make up a judicial branch of a 
central government." Id. The court continued: "The International Tribunal is an 
international criminal court constituting a novelty in the world community." Id.9147. 
94. While I have summarized the opinions of the Trial and Appeals Chambers, I have 
generally refrained from quibbling with their textual readings and factual assertions. It is 
enough to say that alternative readings and interpretations are possible, if not likely. I 
have foregone this type of critique primarily because I feel that it is beside the point; as 
I make clear in the body of this article, other considerations were more important to the 
outcome of BlaWki6. 
95. While the court has often relied on the ICTY Statute and Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
in its rulings, it isunclear why the Trial Chamber felt it necessary to make the extensive 
claim that it did in Blagki. 
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are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to 
the obligation of all parties to cooperate in the Investigation and prosecution of 
war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.
9 6 
Croatia, as a signatory of the Agreement, therefore, would have been 
required to comply with a subpoena issued by the ICTY. While the Tribunal, 
under this reasoning, would still have been reliant on the Security Council 
for the enforcement of subpoenas, a broad precedent that might have put 
the Tribunal into conflict with its essential backers would have been 
avoided. At the same time, those states most reluctant to release evidence 
(like Croatia) would have been obligated to do so. 
IV. BLASKIC AND THE ROME STATUTE 
A. The Legacy of Blagkit 
The general subject of Blagki-the extent and nature of state obligations to 
cooperate with an international tribunal-and the particular issue with 
which the case dealt-the duty to comply with prosecutorial requests for 
evidence-had already been under discussion in the ICC preparatory 
committee meetings well before Tihomir Blaki6 was brought to The 
Hague.97 This being so, the Blagkie decisions quickly found their way into 
the debate surrounding the International Criminal Court. 
98 
96. General Framework Agreement, supra note 10, at 90. 
97. See, e.g., Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., $ 310, U.N. Doc. A/51/22/1996/64 (1996) 
[hereinafter Preparatory Committee Report]; Report of the InternationalLaw Commis-
sion on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session 2 May-22 July 1994, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 129-30, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994); Rolling Text ofArticles 51 and 52, 
Prep. Comm. on the Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., Working Group on Int'l 
Co-operation and Judicial Assistance, U.N. Doc. A!AC.249/1997/VG.5/CRP.2* (1997), 
available at<gopher /gopher. igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/icc/undocs/prepcom 5/art5 152.txt>; 
Report of the Intersessional Meeting from 19 to 30 Jan. 1998 in Zutphen, the 
Netherlands, art. 78, 9 6 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) <gopher:/gopher.igc.apc.org:70/O./orgs/ 
icc/undocs/zutphen/part9.txt>; Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, Addendum, Part One, Draft Statute for the 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conf. of Plenopotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., arts. 54(4)(b), 85, 86(6), 90(2), U.N. Doc. A/ 
CONF.183/2/Add.I, (1998). 
98. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Resolution and Report Recommending the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (2 Feb. 1998) (visited 16 Feb. 2000) 
<gopher V/gopher. igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/icc/ngodocs/abareport.298> (citing Blagkih). 
According to Amnesty International: 
Although the Appeals Chamber in BlagkiL decided that it had no power under Article 29 of the 
Statute ... to issue subpoenas to state officials to testify or to produce documents, nothing prevents 
states from collectively drafting a statute with a more effective procedure. Indeed, unless the court 
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In Rome, at the diplomatic conference to establish an ICC, diplomats 
largely followed the spirit of the decision of the Blagki6 Appeals Chamber. 
Article 93 of the Rome Statute begins with the general rule that "States 
Parties shall . . . comply with requests by the Court to provide . . . [t]he 
provision of records and documents, including official records and docu-
ments[.]" 91The statute then provides for two exceptions. First, if compliance 
with the specific request is "prohibited in the requested State on the basis of 
an existing fundamental legal principle of general application, the requested 
State shall promptly consult with the Court to try to resolve the matter." 00 If 
the state and the court cannot resolve the matter, "the Court shall modify the 
request as necessary. " 101 Second, there is a national security exception: "a 
State Party may deny a request for assistance, in whole or in part, only if the 
request concerns the production of any documents or disclosure of 
evidence which relates to its national security."102 If the court is unsatisfied 
with the state's reasons, it may, in accordance with Article 87(7), "make a 
finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, 
where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security 
Council."' The drafters of the Rome Statute appear to have applied the 
Appeals Chamber decision in Bla~ki6 to the ICC: the court can only make 
"requests" of States Parties; it can only make a finding of non-compliance 
should a state fail to comply; and any coercive measures against the 
non-complying state can only be taken by a group of states, namely the 
Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council. 
has the power to compel subordinates in a chain of command it may well be impossible to 
prosecute superiors for responsibility. 
Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court: Making the Right Choices-Part 
I&l: Ensuring Effective State Cooperation, Al Index: IOR 40/13/97, Nov. 1997, at 53, 
available at <httpV/www.amnesty.it/ailib/aipub/1997/IOR/14001397.htm> (visited 16 
Feb. 2000). See also Commentary for the March-April Preparatory Committee Meeting, 
HuM. RTs. WATCH, Feb. 1998, at § E, available at <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/ 
icc/icc0398.htm> (visited 16 Feb. 2000) ("Human Rights Watch strongly urges del-
egates to follow the guidance of the Trial Chamber ... in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Tihomir Bla~ki. .. "). According to the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights: "The 
recent controversies surrounding the power of [ICTY] to order the testimony and the 
production of documentary evidence by states and state officials highlighted a 
fundamental problem in the exercise of international criminal jurisdiction." Lawyers 
Committee on Human Rights, Compliance with ICC Decisions (International Criminal 
Court Briefing Series, Vol. 1, No. 5, Nov. 1997) (visited 16 Feb. 2000) <httpV/www.lchr 
.org/icc/iccpap5.htm>. 
99. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 93(1)(i) (emphasis added). Article 57(3)(a) gives the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, at the request of the prosecutor, the power to "issue such orders and 
warrants as may be required for the purposes of an investigation." Id. art. 57(3)(a). 
100. Id. art. 93(3). 
101. Id. (emphasis added). This exception seems to deal with the transfer of indicted persons 
or witnesses and not documents. 
102. Id. art. 93(4). 
103. Id. art. 87(7). 
2000 International Criminal Courts 
B. Evaluating Article 93 
For an ICC to operate effectively and to provide for fair trials it must be able 
to secure the cooperation of its state parties in the surrender of suspects and 
in the procurement of the witnesses and evidence necessary to the 
successful investigation and prosecution of the crimes within its jurisdiction. 
Does Article 93 of the Rome Statute do this? 
It seems not. Article 93 (and its related articles) is highly deferential to 
the state parties: The court can make only "requests" (not even "binding 
orders," let alone "subpoenas") to states, and states have two mechanisms 
for escaping compliance. In the event that a state fails to comply with the 
request (a highly likely scenario if one of its own nationals is under 
investigation), the court can only make a finding of non-compliance and 
refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties (or, when appropriate, the 
Security Council) for its consideration. In the Assembly or the Security 
Council, the matter surely will be subject to political considerations. If the 
matter under investigation is one where the major powers support the 
prosecution (such as in the former Yugoslavia), the procedure might work 
and the requisite political will might be garnered to exert sufficient pressure 
on the non-cooperating state. 10 4 If, however, the non-complying state is 
politically or militarily powerful, it is unlikely that the Assembly or the 
Security Council would act. Thus, the court's investigatory powers would be 
uneven, varying according to the power of the state in question. 
On the one hand, Article 93 acknowledges the reality of world politics. 
Even if a future court had subpoena powers and could find a powerful state, 
such as the United States (if it ever signed and ratified the Rome Statute), in 
contempt for non-compliance, it would be unlikely that such a finding 
would be complied with; instead, the court might look foolish because it 
lacked any mechanism to enforce its order. Even if the state was less 
powerful, the court would still need the support of the Assembly of States 
Parties to enforce any order it might make. On the other hand, and more 
importantly, if a future court is to be seen as anything more than the tool of 
the Assembly of States Parties, it must have some independence from that 
body and some means of distancing itself from politics. It is one thing to 
acknowledge the way the world works; it is quite another to concede that 
this is the way it ought to work. 
The structural differences between the ICTY and the ICC are crucial to 
understanding why a broad subpoena power would be damaging to one but 
104. While the Security Council, by virtue of its Chapter VII powers, has the authority to use 
force, it is unclear what coercive powers the Assembly of States Parties might 
legitimately use to ensure compliance with a court's order. 
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essential to the other. The Security Council, under its Chapter VII powers, 
established the ICTY in order to prosecute war crimes within the former 
Yugoslavia. But the ICC was established in a different way and in a different 
context-by a multilateral treaty at an international diplomatic conference. 
All of those who ratify it will agree to its provisions.105 Consequently, an ICC 
treaty that included the subpoena power would be binding on its state 
parties by virtue of their ratifications in the same way that the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is binding on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
While stronger judicial assistance provisions would probably have made it 
more difficult for states to ratify the treaty, it would have been preferable for 
states to be committed to a court that could accomplish its task than for 
them to sign on to a treaty that would be unable to achieve its objective. The 
diplomats in Rome had an opportunity to create an effective treaty, but 
instead (and unfortunately) they opted for a court that will lack some of the 
basic tools necessary for the performance of its functions. 
V. CONCLUSION: FAIR TRIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS? 
The creation of an international criminal court is a serious and perilous 
project. If it succeeds, the court will bring criminals to justice who, 
heretofore, have largely escaped international sanction. If it fails, the court 
could become a "kangaroo court" or it might simply dissolve into irrel-
evance.01 6 As one commentator has recently written, "The danger of failure 
is a mockery of international law giving impetus to those who suggest that 
07it is not law at all!" 1 Similarly, Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt has 
warned: "To raise such hopes but fail to fully implement the system of 
justice thus created is far worse, in my opinion, than having done nothing in 
the first place."108 
The diplomats in Rome could have taken one step toward an effective 
ICC if they had included provisions in the statute that would have given the 
court the ability to obtain the evidence necessary for fair trials. They might 
have learned more, in this regard, from the Trial Chamber decision than 
from the Appeals Chamber judgment. Though the parallels Judge McDonald 
105. Reservations are prohibited. See Id. art. 120. 
106. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Report of the International Law Association, 25 DENV. J. 
INT'L L. & POL'Y 233, 234 (1997).
107. Id. 
108. Power, supra note 45 (quoting Blewitt). 
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and some of the amici' 0 9 drew to domestic subpoena powers were simplistic 
and overdone when applied to the ICTY, the teleological approach that the 
Trial Chamber pursued, when applied to the ICC, might have led to a more 
independent and effective court. The fact that the Rome diplomats were 
unable to solve the problem of obtaining evidence for fair trials in 
international criminal tribunals is cause for concern if and when an 
International Criminal Court finally comes into being. 
109. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by the Max Planck institute for Foreign and 
International Criminal Law, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, Prosecutor v. Bla~ki, Case 
No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, App. Ch., 9'9 49-50 (ICTY 15 Sept. 1997) (comparing the 
approach of national courts to the production of evidence and the limits on such powers 
and concluding that international courts should operate in substantially similar ways). 
